Grain Elevator Credit Sales Contracts and Alternatives to Reduce Their Misuse by Ginder, Roger G.
Economic Staff Paper Series Economics
2-15-1991
Grain Elevator Credit Sales Contracts and
Alternatives to Reduce Their Misuse
Roger G. Ginder
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers
Part of the Agribusiness Commons, Sales and Merchandising Commons, and the Strategic
Management Policy Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economic Staff Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ginder, Roger G., "Grain Elevator Credit Sales Contracts and Alternatives to Reduce Their Misuse" (1991). Economic Staff Paper Series.
230.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/230
Grain Elevator Credit Sales Contracts and Alternatives to Reduce Their
Misuse
Abstract
Credit sales contracts for grain have been widely used as a marketing tool by farmers and elevators. For
farmers, they represent a method (accepted by the IRS) to delay the recognition of grain income until a later
tax period. During periods when storage capacity is short these contracts move grain into the market channel
earlier than might otherwise be the case. Farmers can relinquish title at harvest or later delivery and still
maintain pricing flexibility later in the year when prices may be stronger.
Disciplines
Agribusiness | Sales and Merchandising | Strategic Management Policy
This report is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/230
GRAIN ELEVATOR CREDIT SALES CONTRACTS
AND ALTERNATIVES TO REDUCE THEIR MISUSE
Roger G. Ginder
Professor and Extension Economist
Department of Economics
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa 50011
Staff Paper #223
Februaiy 15,1991
GRAIN ELEVATOR CREDIT SALES CONTRACTS
AND ALTERNATIVES TO REDUCE THEIR MISUSE*
Credit sales contracts for grain have been widely used as a marketing tool by
farmers and elevators. For farmers, they represent a method (accepted by the IRS) to
delay the recognition of grain income until a later tax period. During periods when
storage capacity is short these contracts move grain into the market channel earlier than
might otherwise be the case. Farmers can relinquish title at harvest or later delivery and
still maintain pricing flexibility later in the year when prices may be stronger.
Other marketing advantages to the contracts arise from time to time. Such
advantages vary depending on availability of transportation, the need to rotate
farm-stored grain and similar factors. In times of excess commercial storage capacity,
some elevators have used this form of transaction as a competitive device to gain
possession of grain early in the season and to take,advantage of merchandising >
opportunities. These marketing advantages accrue to both farmers and grain merchants
and have caused the contracts to become more popular during the past several years.
Still there are some serious problems associated with credit sale contracts.
INTERRUPTION OF DEBTOR CREDITOR RELATIONSHIPS
The contracts interrupt some of the accepted title and risk management
relationships among farmers, elevators, and their lenders. It is the interruption of these
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established debtor-creditor relationships that may create a problem. In most cases where
the elevator is financially sound, has adequate cash, and does not default on unsecured
loans, the contracts do not create a serious problem. However, when an elevator begins
to encounter financial difficulty there is a serious potential for abuse. Issuing more
credit sale contracts as a means of borrowing needed cash becomes a nearly irresistible
temptation when the best alternatives involve issuing bad checks for grain and losing the
license, filing for protection under Chapter 11 bankruptcy, or liquidating under Chapter 7
bankruptcy.
A somewhat predictable pattern is followed when financial difficulty arises. The
first symptom is a shortage of working capital and difficulty in obtaining cash, to meet
current obligations and payables. This condition may arise because an operating loss has
drained cash from the business. It may occur because a speculative position in the
commodities market has resulted in a precipitous loss. It may occur because the
business has attempted to grow more rapidly than its capital base will permit. It -may
occur because a large receivable cannot be converted to cash. Mismanagement, fraud,
grain quality loss, inadequate financial accounting and other factors may also be causes
for the problem.
Whatever the reason for the cash problem there is an acute need to generate
additional liquid funds quickly. This may be done through short term borrowing or
issuing additional equity. But if lenders balk and new investors cannot be found to
purchase equity the problem remains. At this point the business would be forced to
cease operations unless additional cash can be injected. Furtherniore, the possibility
exists that secured lenders may initiate proceedings-leading to involuntary bankruptcy.
3For a firm operating in the grain business the credit sale contract offers another
alternative. New credit sales contracts permit the elevator to take possession of the
grain and convert it to cash. Furthermore there is little or no outside review or limit
placed on how much cash is raised in this way. The elevator may raise a great deal of
cash if necessary. The documents are typically written so that payment cannot be made
prior to some future date. Whether it is done to delay recognition of taxable income to
the farmer or to allow the producer to take advantage of market movements, the
payment is not due immediately.
Clearly the intent of such a transaction is not to make a loan from the farmer to
the elevator. Nonetheless it fulfills the major purpose of a short term loan for an
elevator in this cash short position. In particular, it reduces the need for ready cash at
the time the grain is purchased and it buys additional time for the elevator to locate
additional cash.
In fact the producer is supplying high risk capital to the elevator with no explicit
interest return on that capital and no security position if the elevator fails. Only the
savings in storage expenses and the possibility of price improvements offer a potential
return for the action.- Treatment of this capital in past bankruptcy and liquidation cases
has established it as being in a very high risk position for the seller. Thus the seller
should carefully evaluate the financial position of the elevator before entering into such
a contract if this risk is to be minimized or even held to an acceptable level.
MISUSE OF CONTRACTS CAN AFFECT OTHERS NOT SIGNING THEM
While- the majority of credit sales contracts are executed in good faith by all
4parties and can provide the benefits described at the beginning of this paper, their
misuse can have widespread disastrous effects. Misuse can create serious problems for
sellers to the elevator, the seller's lenders, the elevator's lenders, and those responsible
for the regulation and licensing of firms in the grain industry. Even third parties who
buy from or sell to the elevator using cash or forward cash contracts (rather than credit
sale contracts) can be put at risk when credit sales contracts are misused. Nonsufficient
funds checks or repudiation-of cash forward contract are both possible side effects..
Beyond that external effects on other businesses in the community are often observed as
a result of large dollar losses concentrated in a relatively small geographic area.
These potential problems have led to a number of suggestions to reduce the risks
•created by credit sales contracts. Each has advantages and disadvantages. Among
suggested solutions are the following:
1. Totally eliminate the use of credit sales contracts as a legal means of
selling grain.
2. Regulate the use of the .contracts more strictly by placing limits on the
dollar amount of contract that may be issued based on financial position.
3. Require more complete financial disclosure to farmers before they sign
credit sales contracts.
4. Require some type of escrow account when grain is moved.
5. Require a letter of credit from the elevator's lender for credit sale
contracts.
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TOTALLY ELIMINATE CREDIT SALES CONTRACTS
It is tempting to approach the problem by simply eliminating credit sale contracts
altogether. The producer would not be permitted to relinquish title to the elevator
without the safeguards provided in the warehouse law to protect producers -- including
indemnity fund protection. There is no potential for abuse once the contracts have been
eliminated; Although some have questioned whether such a measure would violate
constitutional rights to contract, other disadvantages would accompany a total ban as
well.
This approach would create several kinds of marketing problems for producers
and competitive problems for some elevators. First, when storage is in short supply it
would remove one of the main incentives to move grain further into the market channel.
Producers would not be able to move excess grain into elevators without either pricing it
or placing it under warehouse receipt. Once the available storage at the warehouse has
been exhausted, the producer would be forced to price the grain at the time of delivery
before the elevator could move it into commercial channels. This would lock the farmer
into the position of selling at a seasonal low or accepting an abnormally wide basis in
most years.
A second disadvantage in this approach is the problem it creates for farmers who
wish to delay recognition of taxable income into the next calendar year. Such producers ^
would be forced to store the grain at harvest and carry it into the next year. The current
practice of selling grain at harvest to be priced in the next calendar year would be
eliminated. Unless the farmer was willing to accept current price and receive the income
6at the time of sale the grain could not be marketed.
Finally (and perhaps most problematic) the banning of credit sale contracts would
put Iowa out of step with the grain industiy in the midwest. Availability of credit sales
contracts from elevators in surrounding states would create a situation where Iowa
elevators would lose the business of many producers who want to defer income into a
later tax year. It is not unreasonable to expect that significant volumes of grain within 50
«
miles of the border would move across state lines to elevators offering credit sales
contracts with "reduced" or "free" storage provisions and income or price deferrals
programs.
The net effect of forcing the credit sale to out of state elevators is undesirable in
several respects; (1) It increases the cost to Iowa producers who wish to obtain the
benefits of income deferral and the marketing flexibility offered by the contract; (2) it
places Iowa elevators at a competitive disadvantage to elevators in other states; (3) it
forces Iowa producers wanting to use credit sales contracts to do business with elevators
not operating under the regulatory protection of the Iowa warehouse and grain dealer
laws.
PLACE LIMITS ON THE DOLLAR AMOUNT OF CONTRACTS ISSUED BY
INDIVIDUAL FIRMS
Some have suggested that an upper limit (based on equity) be placed on the
amount of credit sales any firm can issue.' This approach has been employed by the CCC
and USDA warehouse authorities ^ a means of limiting uniform storage agreements and
licensed, storage capacity. While it will not totally prevent losses in the event of elevator
j
failure it provides a rip-stop to limit the magnitude of losses in two ways. First, as an
7elevator approaches insolvency, fewer and fewer contracts can be legally issued. Second,
if an insolvency should occur, it is more probable that at least some equity will be
available to cover unsecured creditors holding credit sales contracts. A major advantage
to this approach is that the credit sales contract -activity is geared to solvency rather, than
being open ended.
There, may be several problems with this approach. There is a possibility of
financial deterioration following the establishment of the equity limit. For example, a
severe operating loss or a commodity speculation loss (accompanied by a reduction in
equity) may occur at any timd Such a loss may occur shortly after the allowable level of
credit sales contracts for an elevator has been established; It would be difficult to ensure
that the intent of the law was being accomplished under these circumstances.
A second problem with the use of.equity based programs is the accuracy of the
asset valuation. Overstatement of fixed or current asset values would result in overstated
equities. Fair and equitable application of an equity based limit on credit sales contracts
would require the use of CPA audits to provide a minimal level of assurance that assets
and liabilities are properly stated.
REQUIRE AN ESCROW ACCOUNT TO BE MAINTAINED TO COVER ANY CREDIT
SALES CONTRACTS
The suggestion has been made that an escrow account be set up for any grain that
is sold under credit sale contract. The idea behind such accounts would be to assure that
sufficient cash would be available to the seller in the event of insolvency and at the same
time preserve the income deferral characteristics of credit sales contracts.
There is little doubt that escrow provisions could accomplish one or the other of
8these objectives very effectively. However, there may be serious difficulties in achieving
both at the same time. That is the escrow accounts may be set up so that the buyer of
the grain has so little control over the balance that a bankruptcy trustee could not pull
these assets into a bankruptcy proceeding. However such an insulation of the proceeds
from the sale of grain may imply that coi^tructive receipt of the proceeds by the
producer has occurred. This would prevent the producer from deferring income into a
later tax year. Action of this kind should not be taken until the legal and tax
ramifications of both these issues can be better understood. Research is underway on
both the bankruptcy and taxation aspects of this,option.
Another potential disadvantage of the escrow approach is the fact that funds
which could be legitimately used by the financially sound elevator are moved to a
separate escrow account. This means that financially sound elevators must substitute
other capital (either internal or borrowed) to replace what has been escrowed. An
opportunity cost to the elevator and in many cases additional costs to all producers using
the elevator would result. Although procedures may exist to allow elevator access to the
escrowed funds for use in operations the producer's access to the funds in bankruptcy
may be lost when this is done.
REQUIRE MORE COMPLETE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE TO FARMERS PRIOR TO
EXECUTING A CONTRACT
Those who wish to avoid intervention as much as possible have suggested an
approach where the producer decides which elevators are financially sound enough to
justify assuming the risks associated with selling under credit sales contract. They favor a
system where producers are given access to adequate financial information on the
9elevator and allowed, to decide for themselves whether it is prudent to write a credit
sales contract with the elevator. The producer would then assume full responsibility for
the consequences if the elevator failed.
To make this approach work the elevator would need to provide accurate
financial statements (including a balance sheet and statement of cash flows) to the
producer prior to execution of a contract. In order to prevent misrepresentation of
assets and liabilities an unqualified opinion audit from a CPA would be necessary. The
farmer would then make a "yes" or "no" decision based on informed knowledge of the
elevator's condition.
Several problems exist in this approach. While fanners now make such decisions
without the financial information, many would not possess the specialized skills necessary
to evaluate the information if it were available. Even where the producer has the
necessary experience and background to ev^uate a complex financial statement there is
no way for a producer to determine how many additional credit sales contracts might be
issued to other producers. The elevator may be in sound condition when the producer
sells using a credit sales contract but issue too many contracts to other farmers after that
point. Nor is there knowledge of other adverse events that m^iy have lessened the
financial strength of the elevator since the disclosed information was compiled.
Beyond these problems miany firms in the industry would resist disclosure. A
significant number of the elevators in Iowa are not publicly held corporations. As a
consequence, they are not required to provide financial statements to outsiders. Many
sole proprietorships, partnerships and closely held corporations would consider making
10.
financial information available to potential credit sales contract customers to be an
invasion of their privacy.
PROVIDE AN IRREVOCABLE NONTRANSFERABLE LETTER OF CREDIT TO THE
PRODUCER
1It has been suggested that producers could be protected by a nonnegotiable
irrevocable letter of credit payable after a specified future date to the Iowa Department
of Agriculture and Land Stewardship to be held for the benefit of producers who sold
grain under credit sales contracts. In this way the producer would be paid even though
the elevator had failed. One advantage of this kind of approach is the maintenance of
the secured lender's position in determining the gross amount of credit available to the
borrowing elevator. It would, therefore, be less disruptive to the normal debtor-creditor
relationships established for other types of transactions.
In many ways it is similar to the type of lending that occurs when company-owned
grain is purchased by the elevator and stored for sale at a later time. The elevator
typically establishes a line of short term credit with a lender for the purchase of grain as
farmers wish to sell. This credit is drawn upon as the company-owned inventory is built
and repaid later after the inventory has been liquidated.
The line of credit is extended by a lender who has presumably determined a
prudent level of borrowing given the elevator's assets, other liabilities, available security,
and, in most cases, its history' of profitability. Lenders usually monitor financial position
and profitability of the elevator closely through monthly reporting.
The credit sale contract short-circuits this external discipline by the lender. It
allows the elevator to increase the level of operating credit without direct lender
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knowledge or any restraint based on financial condition.
Backing credit sales contracts with a letter of credit from the secured lender
would reinstitute this kind of discipline on the elevator. At the same time the elevator
would have access to the liquid assets from credit sales contracts in much the same way
it now does. The elevator would be expected to arrange a line of credit with the lender
to cover expected credit sale contract grain purchases before the lender would issue a
letter of credit The lender would make a judgment about the credit-worthiness of the
elevator in establishing this level. The elevator would then be free to write any level
credit sales contracts less than the line of credit and provide the bank with a security
interest, in the inventories or proceeds from sale of grain.
As the elevator's credit sales contracts are liquidated, the letter of credit may be
cancelled if the elevator is capable of making payment to producer. If not, the lender
makes payment on the letters of credit and moves against the security interest it holds in
the elevator's assets. In this situation, the credit risk assumed by the producer-seller
shifts from the financial viability of the elevator to the financial viability of the financial
institution issuing the letter of credit. However, two entities regulated by different
agencies would have to fail before the producer would lose.
There may be several disadvantages to this approach. Some lenders are not
accustomed to the use of letters of credit. This could create problems in operating
under such a system for clients of those lenders. The standing of the letters of credit in
bankruptcy and their treatment by the IRS could also be a potential problem.
Additional legal analysis would be desirable before concrete action is taken.
. • 12 .
Finally, there is an additional transaction cost as a result of issuing the letters of
credit. While the actual and opportunity cost is much less than the alternatives of
escrowing or banning the contracts, it would be somewhat higher than taking no action.
